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LAW AND THE COMMON GooD
Ofer Raban*
In this piece, Ofer Raban takes issue with the claim advanced in a
recent book by Brian Tamanaha that the Rule of Law requires that
all our laws advance the common good (ratherthan the interests of any
narrowfaction). That claim, says Raban, is out of date with modern
pluralistic sensibilities, and with our modern understanding of law
and the legislative process. But the fact that the law need not always
advance the interests of sodety as a whole, and may therefore be used
as a toolfor the advancement of some at the expense of others, does
not mean that the law itsef is not always a common good-for the Rule
of Law means, first andforemost, the rule of reason and rationalit;
and passing our social regulations through the prism of reason and
rationality is an indisputable common good.
Brian Tamahana's "Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law,"
selected last year for special honour by the Association of American Publishers,
is a book about an allegedly dangerous transformation of legal consciousness from a "non-instrumental" to an "instrumental" view of the law.' The noninstrumental view, says Tamanaha, regards the content of our laws as determined
by factors beyond our control. This view is most evident in the theory of "natural
law," which dominated the legal mind for millennia, and according to which
human laws wei determined by the very nature of the universe. "True law,"
said Cicero in the first century B.C., "is right reason in agreement with nature; it
is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting... It is a sin to try to
alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part it, and it is impossible
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to abolish it entirely."' Thirteen centuries later, Thomas Aquinas echoed this
view when he said, "every human law has just so much of the nature of law as
is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of
nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law."' A similar conception
figured in the claims of 18h century judges and lawyers who resisted legislative
tinkering with the English common law. The common law, declared a celebrated
treatise of the time, was a collection of "rules and maxims of immutable truth
and justice," a "perfection of reason" that should not be tampered with or
overridden by positive legislation.'
By contrast, says Tamanaha, our legal world is dominated by an
"instrumental" view of the law, one which sees the law as mere "means to an
end... [A]n instrument of power to advance [people's] personal interests or the
interests or policies of the individuals or groups they support. Today, law is
widely viewed as an empty vessel to be filled as desired, and to be manipulated,
invoked, and utilised in the furtherance of ends." And this new view, says
Tamanaha, is dangerous to the Rule of Law.
Why is the instrumental conception dangerous? The "critical difference"
between the non-instrumental idea of the law and the instrumental one revolves
around "shifts in view about 'public interest'."s Thinkers as diverse as Plato,
Thornas Aquinas, John Locke, and the American Founding Fathers all believed
that any legitimate law must aim at advancing the "common good" - rather
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than the interests of any narrow faction. But the instrumental conception of
law weakens this important principle. By viewing the law as a means to an end
and hence as an "empty vessel to be filled as desired," the instrumental
conception turns law into an instrument of whoever happens to hold the reins
of power. The result, says Tamanaha, is proliferation of legislation aimed at
benefiting special interests; lawyers willing to put the interests of their clients
above all else - to the point of making specious arguments or even committing
fraud; and judges increasingly keen on effecting their preferred purposes and
policies instead of following the law.
And yet, as Tamanaha concedes, the "non-instrumental" conceptions of
law have by and large passed from the world, and are not likely to return. We
have come to reject the idea that the content of the law is somehow fixed by a
divine arrangement or "incontrovertible reason" announced by priests or jurists:
we feel free to mold our law as we see fit, largely emancipated from the shackles
of religious authority or tradition. Hence, our conception of the law is
"instrumental" - we believe that the law is for us to shape in the pursuit of our
chosen goals and interests. We see law "as a means to an end."
But is Tamanaha correct that our new conception poses a threat to our
Rule of Law? The answer depends, at least in part, on Tamanaha's claim - in
fact more an assumption than a claim, since Tamanaha never seeks to defend it
- that the Rule of Law means that all laws must aim at the "common good," so
that it is a violation of the Rule of Law to have laws that serve small factions
rather than the common interest.
One problem with this assertion is that it sounded more reasonable in the
distant and far more homogeneous societies of Plato, John Locke, or Thomas
Jefferson. Moreover, as Tamanaha himself concedes, even then - perhaps
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especially then - the idea has often been misused.' A quick reflection on the
legal status of, say, women and minorities during those periods confirms the
aptness of Tamanaha's concession. That the "common good" is the only proper
end of the law is a vacuous principle if those who make the law also believe,
like Louis XIV, that "L'Etat - c'est moi" so that the "common good" is what's
good for them. Moreover, if the only proper object of the law is the "common
good" it may be particularly difficult to advance the legal interests of underrepresented or heretical groups - and quite easy to trample them. It is worth
remembering that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,' which
upheld the criminal conviction of a black man for occupying a "whites only"
train coach, was explained on the ground that the statute was "enacted in good
faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or
oppression of a particular class."'
Theoretically speaking, the claim that we all share a "common good" - a
Rouseauian "general will" to which we all do, or should, subscribe"o - has come
under skepticism from two related directions. First, some have turned skeptical
as to whether there is in fact a single "common good" of which we can all
speak, rather than many competing and potentially contradictory ones." Second,
even those who believe that the "common good" remains a viable concept have
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become suspicious of authoritative claims as to what the "common good"
entails, and have consequently come to accept the legitimacy of a wide and
indeed conflicting spectrum of opinions on that matter - a spectrum we expect
our laws to reflect.'" Accordingly, we think there is nothing wrong, insofar as
the Rule of Law is concerned, with legislation aimed at benefiting union workers,
or corporations, or the homeless, or farmers, or stock owners - either because
we believe there is nothing wrong with benefiting one group at a time, or because
we think it legitimate to believe (even if we personally do not) that such measures
benefit the "common good." Indeed we have developed theories of legislation
- "interest group pluralism" for example, that explain and justify legislative
action in a world controlled by opposing. groups advancing distinct and often
contradictory interests and values (that is, in a legislative environment wholly
skeptical of the very notion of the "common good"). Legislation, say such
theories, is the outcome of the bargains and compromises struck among those
representing competing groups. Legislators who advance rural interests, or prounion interests, or retirees' interests, bargain and compromise with fellow
legislators who advance urban interests, or pro-business interests, or junior
employees' interests. And these legislators do nothing wrong by seeking to
advance the interests of small interest groups- in fact, this is precisely how the
legislative process works in a modern pluralist society like ours. Legislation is
legitimate not because it is aimed at some elusive "common good" but because
it expresses the different interests and values of different constituencies.
Our modern skepticism toward the notion of the "common good," coupled
with the growing legitimacy of a wide range of opinions regarding what the
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"common good" entails, also account for the apparent shift in lawyers' selforientation - from the view of the lawyer as an "officer of the court" to that
stressing fidelity to clients' interests. Tamanaha criticises the American Bar
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which practically
defines a lawyer's role in terms of fidelity to clients' interests rather than to the
"public interest" (even the rule that allow a lawyer to refuse appointment by.a
tribunal for representation she finds "repugnant" does so only where "the client
or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the dient-lanyer
relationship or the lanyer's ability to represent the client"'13).
But in a pluralistic society like ours, it seems natural that lawyers ought to
give priority to their clients' interests over their own conception of the common
good, or their own ethical beliefs. The operating principle here is that unpopular
or even ostracised views of the "public interest" have a right to be heard. A
professional bar protective of the "common good" may easily shut out of the
legal system a variety of voices that should receive effective representation.
This is especially true where, as in the case of the legal profession, members of
the professional Bar are primarily drawn from a socio-economic elite. Lawyers'
fidelity to their clients' interest, rather than to their own opinions of where
society's interests lie, is a result of the wish to open the legal system to a variety
of interests and opinions. Sure enough, not all opinions or interests are legitimate;
but which are and which aren't should be decided only after effective
representation has been rendered - not before.
There is another problem with Tamanaha's thesis. Tamanaha is not alone
in claiming that laws must aim exclusively at the "common good," and that the
modern age has seen a weakening of that principle; but the claim that this had
been the result of a shift from a non-instrumental to an instrumental conception
of law is a novel one. In fact, however, the most natural reading of the relation
between the two is the reverse - skepticism towards the "common good" ideal
seemed to have led to the shift from a non-instrumental to an instrumental
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conception of law. When belief in social and moral universal truths collapsed,
casting doubt on the notion of an authoritative "common good," it became
impossible to hold on to the view that the law was an immutable embodiment
of divine truth or justice. Natural law theory- the paradigmatic non-instrumental
conception of law - began to die when belief in universal moral truths collapsed.
The next obvious step was to view the law as a means to ever-changing ends.
Thus, Tamanaha's alleged threat to the Rule of Law (i.e., the decline in the legal
ideal of the "common good") lies deeper than, and prior to, any shift in legal
consciousness - in the shift to the spirit of modernity itself.'4

Law as a Common Good
The shift from a non-instrumental to an instrumental conception of law,
says Tamanaha, and the attendant decline in the idea that all laws must serve
the "common good," threatens, to turn our law into "a pure instrument of
coercive power," as in those "blighted societies in which power has its way with
scant restraint, and the powerless have little protection."" I doubt that the
blighted societies to which Tamanaha alludes owe their misfortune to this or
that conception of law (power usually has its way in these societies despite the
law, not because of it); and I also think, as I argue above, that Tamanaha is
wrong to believe that the Rule of Law means that our laws must always aim at
the "common good." Still, the question remains as to whether, if such is the
case, the Rule of Law itsefis a "common good" - that is, a social institution
that is a benefit to us all. After all, if law is a mere device in society's power
struggles, "an empty vessel to be filled as desired" (as Tamanaha puts it), isn't
it a socially neutral instrumentality rather than the unqualified good some see in
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it? Isn't it, as Tamanaha claims, "a pure instrument of coercive power" and
therefore a potential force of social evil rather than of social good?
I think that the answer to these questions is a resounding 'no.' The Rule of
Law is a highly desirable social institution that serves the interests of everybody;
it is a "common good." The Rule of Law is a desirable social institution not
because it entails that our laws exclusively serve common interests or values (it
doesn't), nor simply because it is a mechanism by which the different interests
and values of a society can find their practical expression. Rather, the Rule of
Law is a desirable social institution because, above all else, it entails the primacy
of rationality in social regulation. Modern law embraces one overarching
principle - that of justifiability. Law is the medium through which we convert
naked power and interest into rational rules that we then subject to the
requirements of reasonableness and justifiability when applied to actual cases.
Law is about argument, and debate, and justifiable decision-making; law is the
forun of reason - which is why the Rule of Law means freedom from arbitrary
rule.

A nice demonstration of this point begins with Ronald Dworkin's discussion
of "checkerboard statutes." Dworkin, today's most important legal theorist,
has famously posed the following question:
Do the people of North Dakota disagree whether justice requires
compensation for product defects that manufacturers could not
reasonably have prevented? Then why should their legislature not
impose this "strict" liability on manufacturers of automobiles but not
on manufacturers of washing machines?... Do the British divide on
the morality of abortions? Why should Parliament not make abortions
criminal for pregnant women who were born in even years but not for
those born in odd ones?' 6
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What is it, asked Dworkin, that makes such statutory solutions completely
unacceptable to us? Why are such "checkerboard statutes" (as Dworkin calls
them) not valid legislative compromises? Dwokrin's answer was that we find
these laws unacceptable because they do not express one moral position: instead,
they express two different and irreconcilable moral positions. On the one hand,
they express the moral position that manufacturers should pay compensation
even for defects they cannot reasonably prevent, or that abortions should be
allowed; and, on the other, they express the moral position that manufacturers
should not compensate for defects they cannot reasonably prevent, and that
abortions should be forbidden. And this, said Dworkin, is a violation of a
principle he calls Integrity - which requires that all our laws speak with one
moral voice.
Dworkin's is an interesting suggestion, but I believe that, as an answer to
his question, it is ultimately wrong." But my purpose here is not to offer criticism
of Dworkin but to show that the answer to Dworkin's question reveals the
essence of modern law in the requirement of reason and justifiability.
The most obvious explanation as to why we reject checkerboard statutes,
as Dworkin also noted, is that they violate the "equality before the law" principle;
that is, the idea that the similarly situated are to be treated equally. But this
answer - which is certainly true - in fact obscures the deeper significance of
our rejection of checkerboard statutes. It directs us to the idea of "equality,"
whereas the real problem with checkerboard statutes is not that they lack equality,
but that they lack rationality; they lack a justification. This is easy to see if we
concentrate on only half of one of Dworkin's checkerboard statutes - "Why
should Parliament not make abortions criminal for pregnant women who were
born in even years?." We need not see the second half of this statute to know
that the statute is unacceptable. The problem is not merely that the statute
treats people unequally, but that we can think of no reason as to why it does
what it does. We would feel the same if we saw a statute that forbids abortion
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to woman with blue eyes. We are offended by such statutes, and find such statutes
unacceptable, because we identify no justification for these statutory
requirements.
What Dworkin's question demonstrates is that we expect our legal rules to
be supported by publicly identifiable justifications, and herein lies the real essence
of the Rule of Law and its desirability as a social institution: our rules of law
are all supported by public justifications, and their applications revolve around
these justifications and their reasoned implementation. Not all systems of social
regulation have this requirement. The requirement of justifiability is not found,
for example, in the case of religious laws: people are expected to follow religious
rules whether they can identify their justification or not. Orthodox Jews and
Muslims, for example, are forbidden to shave their beards, and most do not
demand a justification in order to follow that rule - they just follow it because
they consider it part of their religious obligations.
Modern law is different. It presents a special form of social regulation - a
form that requires public justifications for all its requirements, and for the
implementation of these requirements. Modern law is about freedom from
arbitrariness, which not only means that legal rules need be known in advance
and consistently applied, but also that they need to make sense - both when they
are written and when they are applied. Law is certainly a "means to an end," but
its modus operandiplaces rational limitations on its means and on its ends, thereby
making it an indisputable "common good."
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